Naval War College Review
Volume 55
Number 4 Autumn

Article 15

2002

While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military
Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today
Richard Norton
Donald Kagan
Fredrick W. Kagan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Norton, Richard; Kagan, Donald; and Kagan, Fredrick W. (2002) "While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the
Threat to Peace Today," Naval War College Review: Vol. 55 : No. 4 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/15

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Norton et al.: While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the T

the decay of the Ottoman Empire seems
to suggest, contra Mearsheimer, that
wars can be caused as much by the
weakness as by the strength of a key actor. Both these points have suggestive
applications as we look to the twentyfirst century. The war against terrorism
might well be the occasion for the formation of a global “concert” of the great
powers. The greatest threat to such a
concert could well be the continuing
weakness of Russia—not, as Mearsheimer holds, the rising strength of
China.
CARNES LORD

Naval War College

Kagan, Donald, and Fredrick W. Kagan. While
America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness,
and the Threat to Peace Today. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000. 483pp. $32.50

Did the leadership of the United States
throw away a priceless opportunity to
bring stability, prosperity, and peace to
the world in the decade following the
end of the Cold War, as surely as the
leadership of Great Britain failed to
grasp a similar opportunity following the
end of the First World War? For Donald
and Fredrick Kagan, the answer is a resounding yes. While America Sleeps is
their attempt not only to show how opportunities were squandered but also to
highlight the similarities of both situations. The Kagans argue that both
states dangerously reduced the size of
their military forces, falsely believed in
the saving power of technology,
failed to exercise strategic leadership, and embarked on a pattern of
“pseudo-engagement.” The importance of the central question and the
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authors’ credentials make this a book to
be taken seriously.
The Kagans, both historians of note,
make a potent father-and-son team.
Donald Kagan, the Hillhouse Professor
of History and Classics at Yale University, has produced an impressive body of
work, including the best-selling A History of Warfare. Fredrick W. Kagan, currently a professor of military history at
West Point, is perhaps less well known
to the general public but has impressive
credentials in his own right.
While America Sleeps is divided into
three sections. The first, “Britain between the Wars,” chronicles that state’s
transition from a globally dominant
power in 1918 to one of near-fatal
weakness by the mid-1930s. It pays special attention to the Chanak crisis of
1922, the Corfu affair of 1923, the
Locarno Treaty of 1925, the ItalianEthiopian War of 1934–35, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936.
The second, “The United States after
the Cold War,” follows a generally similar approach, addressing particularly
the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the
U.S. intervention in Somalia from 1991
to 1993, the occupation of Haiti in
1994, the Clinton administration’s attempts to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, that same
administration’s efforts to curtail Iraqi
production of weapons of mass destruction, and American responses to
conflict in the Balkans. The true third
section, although actually included in
the second section of the book, is the
concluding chapter, in which the authors clearly state their belief that the
United States is at risk of “suffering a
fate similar to that which befell Britain
in the 1930s.” They present an argument supporting this conclusion and
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offer the chilling suggestion that it may
already be too late to prevent such an
outcome.
While America Sleeps is rich in background material. Defense strategies,
budgets, building programs, and much
more are fully and clearly discussed.
For example, the section on how both
the United States and the United Kingdom turned to technology as compensation for diminished force structure is
fascinating. Readers will find compelling the portraits of both countries,
depicted as states weary of conflict,
desirous of maintaining dominance at
the lowest possible cost, and eventually
relying too heavily on inadequately led
and maintained diplomatic services.
Some areas of While America Sleeps are
open to criticism. One potential failing is
that explaining how events between 1919
and the mid-1930s led to war is a very
different thing from explaining how different events would have led to peace.
Also, the authors do not address in detail
the severe domestic political opposition
that choosing a different strategy might
have encountered; such difficulties are
mentioned only to remark they could
have been overcome. There are also discrepancies. The authors imply, for example, that President Bill Clinton was
never able to bring himself to order an
invasion of Haiti, that U.S. forces were
only “prepared” to invade. In reality the
forces described were actually in the process of invasion when the military regime of General Raoul Cedras yielded to
U.S. negotiators.
Some of the authors’ subjective interpretations are also open to debate. The
Kagans are critical of British leaders in
1936 for being overly fearful of the Italian navy should British opposition to
Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia lead to
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conflict. Yet it is hard to see how Britain
could not have been concerned with Italian naval power. The Italian ships were
new and well handled, and they would
have had air support for any operation
near the Italian Peninsula. In a more
modern example, the decision not to
force the landing of the USS Harlan
County (LST 1196) at Port-au-Prince
during the confrontation with Haiti is
strongly criticized. There is no doubt
that the image of a U.S. Navy warship
backing away from a governmentdirected mob did not reflect credit upon
the United States or its military forces.
However, the authors might have more
fully explored the potential consequences of a forcible landing. The ship
was there on a noncombatant mission,
with the ostensible permission of the
Cedras regime. If a landing had been
carried out, potentially killing many
Haitians, significant domestic and international repercussions could have been
expected to result. Additionally, it is unlikely that the original mission could
then have been carried out at all.
One last criticism deserves mention. As
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May have
long reminded us, all analogies are suspect. The power of analogies is so great
that arguments by analogy almost inevitably result in flawed decision making.
This is in large part because all too often
historical analogies invoked as decision
aids are shallow circumstantially and far
more different from the situation at
hand than they are similar. Yet once the
analogy has been invoked the damage
often has been done, and the course of
action suggested will be followed to its
unsatisfactory end. To their credit the
Kagans remind the reader that “the
United States at the end of the millennium is not England between the wars.”
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They point out that comparisons of
present policies to those of the British at
Munich are premature and that it is not
their intention to draw precise parallels
between the British and U.S. experiences. However, these admissions come
only in the very last chapter, after the
reader has had every opportunity to
make just such comparisons.
Despite these critical comments, While
America Sleeps is very much worth reading. The Kagans are asking the right
questions. Their warnings about the fate
of states that reduce military capabilities
to dangerously low levels, lack consistent
strategic visions, and replace sound
strategy with wishful thinking are more
germane than ever.
So too are the questions their work
points to but does not ask. Can democracies avoid reducing military capabilities without the impetus of a visible
external threat? Does state behavior
motivated by self-interest weaken all alliances over time? Can a democracy
survive taking on the mantle of world
policeman? Can wars be prevented
through consistent displays of strength
and purpose? These are questions that
reading this book evokes, questions that
should be considered and discussed far
more than they are.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Detter, Ingrid. The Law of War. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000. (2d ed.) 516pp.
$39.95

This is the second edition of Ingrid
Detter’s sweeping survey of the law relating to the “modern state of war.” The
first edition, published in 1987, was then
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reviewed by, among others, Professors
Howard Levie (American Journal of International Law, vol. 83 [1989], p. 194)
and Leslie Green (Canadian Yearbook of
International Law [1988], p. 473), two
distinguished former holders of the
Stockton Chair of International Law at
the Naval War College. Both reviewers
identified numerous inaccuracies and
misreadings of source documents. The
second edition is intended to explore the
changing legal context of modern warfare since 1987. A reader interested in
this edition should first read the earlier
reviews. Regrettably, the representative
deficiencies pointed out by Levie and
Green still persist, and a fully balanced
discussion of particularly important legal
issues is lacking.
Typical errors left unchanged include
Detter’s erroneous position regarding
the treatment of prisoners of war. She
states that the 1949 “Geneva Convention
III on Prisoners of War specifies [in Article 4] that there need be no fighting for
the Convention to apply; it is sufficient
for persons to be captured.” There is no
such provision in the convention. Detter
also continues to assert that the convention provides that prisoners of war must
not be subjected to interrogation, because Article 17 obliges prisoners to provide only their name, rank, date of birth,
and serial number. Article 17, however,
then continues, proscribing physical or
mental torture, or any other form of coercion, to secure information from prisoners of war. Interrogation short of such
prohibited actions is not prohibited by
the convention. While a prisoner of war
is required to give the identifying information, international law does not prohibit a prisoner from giving more than
this, nor a captor from seeking more
—so long as torture is not used.

3

